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Why be moral? Children’s explicit
motives for prosocial-moral action
Sonia Sengsavang, Kayleen Willemsen and Tobias Krettenauer *
Department of Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada
Recent research on young children’s morality has stressed the autonomous and internal
nature of children’s moral motivation. However, this research has mostly focused on
implicit moral motives, whereas children’s explicit motives have not been investigated
directly. This study examined children’s explicit motives for why they want to engage in
prosocial actions and avoid antisocial behavior. A total of 195 children aged 4–12 years
were interviewed about their motives for everyday prosocial-moral actions, as well as
reported on their relationship with their parents. Children’s explicit motives to abstain
from antisocial behavior were found to be more external and less other-oriented than
their motives for prosocial action. Motives that reflected higher levels of internal motivation
became more frequent with age. Moreover, positive parent-child relationships predicted
more other-oriented motives and greater explication of moral motives. Overall, the study
provides evidence that children’s explicit moral motivation is far more heterogeneous than
prominent theories of moral development (past and present) suggest.
Keywords: moral motivation, moral development, autonomy, childhood, prosocial behavior, antisocial behavior,
parenting
Introduction
In contemporary research on moral development, it is commonly understood that young children
do not engage in prosocial-moral actions out of obedience to authority, fear of punishment, or
because of tangible rewards they expect from others, as Piaget (1932/1999) and Kohlberg (1976)
would have stressed. Rather, children spontaneously engage in prosocial and moral actions because
they genuinely care about others’ well-being and because they want to do what they consider
right. Many studies seem to converge toward this point. In the following, three prominent lines of
research are taken as examples: social domain theory, infants’ helping behavior, and development
of children’s empathy.
Social domain theory has extensively examined children’s judgments and evaluations of
prototypical moral and conventional transgressions (for an overview, see Smetana, 2006) with
the general conclusion that even 3–4 year-olds differentiate between moral, conventional, and
prudential concerns, with moral rule transgressions ranked most severely. Whereas, conventional
rules are needed in order to maintain societal order, moral rules serve to establish fairness, avoid
harm-doing, and promote other’s well-being. As domain theory maintains, the obligatory nature
of children’s morality does not depend on authorities, laws, or customs. Children are motivated to
follow moral rules “because it is the right thing to do,” as Nucci (2002) aptly put it. Thus, according
to domain theory, moral rules are internally binding to children.
Recent research on children’s helping behavior, although starting from largely different
conceptual and methodological grounds, arrives at similar conclusions. In a series of
experiments, Warneken and Tomasello (2006, 2007) demonstrated that 14–18 months-old
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infants spontaneously engage in helping behavior without being
explicitly asked to do so and without being offered a benefit
in return. Furthermore, it was found that offering extrinsic
rewards for helping behavior undermined children’s motivation
to help others (Warneken and Tomasello, 2008), whereas the
presence vs. absence of parents did not influence the frequency
of children’s helping (Warneken and Tomasello, 2013). From
these findings, the authors conclude that young children are
intrinsically motivated to help others regardless of instrumental
rewards, and regardless of any desire to please their parents. It
is suggested that this intrinsic motivation to help others forms an
important evolutionary basis for human altruism (Warneken and
Tomasello, 2009).
Instrumental helping as studied by Warneken and Tomasello
is an early form of prosocial behavior that does not imply a
profound understanding of other’s emotional needs, nor does
it require the reconciliation of prosocial concerns with egoistic
desires (cf. Dunfield et al., 2011). Even though more demanding
forms of prosocial behavior, such as comforting and sharing
with others, typically need more time to develop (Svetlova et al.,
2010), they seem to be no less internally motivated. A vast
body on children’s empathy development demonstrates that
prosocial behavior is strongly motivated by children’s ability to
respond empathically to others’ needs (Eisenberg et al., 2006).
By contrast, personal distress in reaction to others’ emotions
potentially undermines prosocial behavior (Eisenberg et al.,
2010). Many studies demonstrated that children’s sensitivity to
others’ needs grows in the context of positive and supportive
relationships with caregivers (e.g., Thompson et al., 2006).
Thus, whereas Warneken and Tomasello (2006) emphasize
the evolutionary nature of instrumental helping, this by no
means implies that social factors are unimportant for prosocial
development (cf. Pettygrove et al., 2013; Hammond and
Carpendale, 2015).
In summarizing these and related findings from other research
areas (e.g., theory of mind, attachment), Thompson (2012) in a
paper entitled “Whither the preconventional child?” suggested to
abandon the notions of moral heteronomy and preconventional
morality altogether that were typically used to characterize
childhood. According to Thompson, these notions obstruct
progress toward a life span theory of moral development as they
distort our understanding of the developmental preconditions
for moral maturity. “As researchers of early moral development
have appreciated, the conceptual skills of the early years are a
foundation for the development of a humanistic, cooperative, and
relational moral orientation, not an obstacle to be overcome in
later years” (Thompson, 2012, p. 426).
Naturally, research on early moral development is based on
behavioral observations and thus focuses on children’s implicit
motives for prosocial-moral action. However, any theory of
moral development has to deal with the fact that morality is
not limited to the level of implicit motives. It is an important
developmental achievement prompted by growing cognitive
and verbal abilities that children become increasingly aware
of their emotions, desires, and goals (see, for example, Flavell,
1999). Moral development is no exception from this general
trend. Children develop explicit conceptions about their moral
preferences (Krettenauer et al., 2013). These explicit preferences
do not necessarily match with implicit motives.
It is generally assumed that implicit and explicit motives
follow different developmental trajectories (McClelland et al.,
1989). Whereas, implicit motives are shaped early in life by
preverbal and affective experiences, explicit motives are assumed
to develop through verbally mediated learning. Moreover, the
two forms of motivation tend to influence different types of
behavior. Implicit motives tend to predict spontaneous behavior
over extended periods of time. By contrast, explicit motives were
found to be more predictive of decision-making in situations
that are of perceived relevance to these motives. As moral action
manifests itself in spontaneous behaviors as well as deliberate
decision-making, any account of children’s moral motivation that
is solely based on implicit motives appears to be incomplete.
Thus, whereas research provided strong evidence that children’s
prosocial-moral behavior is internally motivated on the implicit
level, it has to be considered an open question whether this
internal motivation is present on the level of explicit motivation,
as well. This question defines the focus of the present paper.
In addressing the issue of children’s explicit motives for
prosocial-moral action, we do not intend to question previous
research on infants’ implicit prosocial motivation, nor do we
claim that children’s explicit motives for prosocial-moral action
to date have been a completely uncharted territory of research
on moral development (for a discussion of previous research and
its limitations see section below). Rather, we want to draw the
readers’ attention to the fact that any appreciation of children’s
morality that is solely based on implicit motives seems to be
incomplete. As children develop explicit motives for prosocial-
moral action, a second motivational system emerges that is partly
independent (but certainly not fully separated) from children’s
implicit motivation. Piaget (1932/1999) maintained that moral
development in action precedes the forms of heteronomous and
autonomous morality he observed at later developmental periods
(cf. Carpendale, 2009; Hammond, 2014). Thus, the intrinsic
nature of moral motivation found in young children may not
be a dominant feature throughout the course of development.
Following this perspective, it may be premature to fully abandon
the founding theories of research on moral development (Piaget
and Kohlberg) as Thompson (2012) suggested. Rather, it might
be advisable to preserve those insights of Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s
theories that seem to be valid today and to discard only those
aspects that were misleading.
Research on children’s social-moral reasoning has a long
history in developmental psychology but is of limited value when
it comes to investigating explicit motives for moral actions, for
various reasons. As described before, social domain theory offers
an internalist view of children’s moral motivation by stressing
the autonomous nature of young children’s justifications of
moral rules. However, children’s cognitive understanding of
moral rules does not necessarily correspond with their level
of moral motivation (Nunner-Winkler, 2009). Justifications for
why people in general should (not) engage in certain behaviors
do not automatically provide the corresponding motives for
moral action, as various models that link moral judgment with
action imply (for an overview, see Garz et al., 1999). From
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this perspective, rule justification are not a valid indicator of
explicit motives, whereas research that asks children to make a
deliberate decision in a given situation and to provide reasons
for this decision is closer to tapping into explicit moral motives.
However, past research on children’s moral decision-making
was mostly based on Kohlberg’s theory and methodology, using
dilemma situations that were highly remote to children as well as
a concept of moral stages that largely ignored the variability of
reasoning within and across situations.
A notable exception is Eisenberg’s (1986) research on the
development of children’s prosocial reasoning. Eisenberg used a
broad range of categories for coding reasons children provided
when making prosocial decisions. In line with research on
children’s implicit motives, Eisenberg found that concern for
others’ needs played a pivotal role for prosocial decisions. At the
same time, however, egoistic self-concerns (including concerns
about direct reciprocity similar to Stage 2 reasoning in Kohlberg’s
scheme) were not uncommon, especially in younger children
(for similar findings, see Keller, 1996). Moreover, the use of
internalized affect (positive as well as negative) as a reason
for prosocial choices significantly increased with age. Overall,
young children’s explicit motives were less intrinsic than research
focusing on implicit motives suggests.
However, in Eisenberg’s (1986) studies, only prosocial
dilemmas were used in which the role of prohibitions, authorities,
and formal obligations was deliberately minimized. This defines
an important limitation of this research, as morality certainly
goes beyond prosocial actions of helping, sharing, or caring.
Morality includes both prescriptions (do’s) and proscriptions
(don’ts). Prescriptions or positive moral obligations focus on
promoting others’ well-being, whereas proscriptive or negative
morality focuses on harm avoidance. The difference between
positive and negative morality has important implications
for self-regulation, motivation, and emotions (Janoff-Bulman
et al., 2009; Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Krettenauer
and Jia, 2013). As Kochanska (2002) demonstrated, the two
demand contexts evidence distinct links with rule internalization.
Correspondingly, children’s explicit motives for prosocial actions
might differ from the motives that prevent them from
intentionally harming others.
The Present Study
The present study aimed at investigating children’s explicit
motives for prosocial-moral actions while avoiding the
shortcomings of past research outlined above. Thus, children’s
moral motives were not inferred from rule justifications or
decision-making in hypothetical dilemma situations. Instead,
children were explicitly asked what motivates them to engage
in everyday prosocial-moral actions, such as sharing and
helping, as well as not stealing or not pushing others. These
everyday moral actions were systematically sampled from the
two contexts of prescriptive and proscriptive morality in order
to avoid any overgeneralization by drawing from one behavioral
context alone. Thus, particular attention was devoted to the
context-specificity of children’s explicit moral motives.
Three questions were addressed: (1) What are important
explicit motives for children’s prosocial and moral actions? (2)
How do these motives change with age? (3) In what way are
children’s explicit motives for prosocial-moral action related to
parenting?
In line with findings reported by Eisenberg (1986), it was
expected that concerns for others’ needs are an important
explicit motive for prosocial actions, but less so in the context
of negative morality. In order to prevent antisocial behavior
among children, parents often provide verbal directives and
enforce rule compliance (e.g., Dahl and Campos, 2013). As a
consequence, children’s avoidance of antisocial behavior may
be more externally motivated than their prosocial actions.
Regardless of these context differences, it can be assumed
that children in general become better able to express their
motives for prosocial-moral actions with increasing age due to
growing verbal and cognitive abilities. Thus, a general increase
in children’s ability to articulate their motives for prosocial-
moral actions was expected. Finally, it was expected that positive
parenting, which is supportive of children’s autonomy, would
be associated with higher levels of internal moral motivation
as reflected in children’s explicit motives. As was demonstrated
before, social contexts that are supportive of self-determination
generally lead to an increased congruence between explicit and
implicit motives (Thrash et al., 2010; Schattke et al., 2011).
As a consequence, children who experience the relationships
with their parents as harmonious and supportive may be better
able to articulate their implicit motives for prosocial-moral
action.
Methods
Participants
The sample consisted of 195 children from Junior- and Senior-
Kindergarten (JK-SK; n = 56; M = 5.56 years; SD = 0.59;
35 males), Grades 2–3 (n = 70; M = 8.49 years; SD =
0.58; 35 males), and Grades 5–6 (n = 69; M = 11.46 years;
SD = 0.59; 36 males). The participants ranged in age from 4
to 12 years (M = 8.65; SD = 2.44; 51.3% males). Information
letters and consent forms were sent home with children from
consenting elementary schools in Kitchener/Waterloo, Ontario,
Canada. The schools were located in socially heterogeneous
neighborhoods with predominantly middle-class background.
Parental written consent and children’s oral assent were obtained
before participants were asked to do an interview and complete
a questionnaire. For participating in this study, children in
Kindergarten received a small gift from an assortment of choices
worth approximately $5 (e.g., puzzles, toy cars, skipping ropes).
Children in Grades 2–3 were given a choice of a small toy or $5
in cash, and Grades 5–6 received $5 in cash. The Research Ethics
Board at Wilfrid Laurier University approved this study.
Measures and Procedure
Mixed-methods were employed including questionnaires and
individual child interviews. All interviews were audio taped and
transcribed verbatim. The average length of time to complete
the entire interview and questionnaire was approximately 30–
40min.
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Explicit Motives for Prosocial-Moral Action
Participants completed the Children’s Moral Self Puppet Interview
(Krettenauer et al., 2013; Sengsavang and Krettenauer, 2015).
In this interview, children watched 23 short videos of two
puppets engaging in a dialog about (im) moral preferences. One
puppet states a preference for moral behavior or, alternatively, an
aversion to immoral behavior, whereas the other puppet states
the opposite (e.g., “I like to be kind to others” vs. “I don’t like
to be kind to others”; “I like to make other children angry”
vs. “I don’t like to make other children angry”). Children are
asked to choose between one of the two puppets. In 10 of the
23 videos, children are further asked why they would want to
engage in the described prosocial behavior or why they would
not want to act in this antisocial way (e.g., “Why would you
want to be kind to others?,” “Why would you not want to make
other children angry?”). These ten interview questions were used
to assess children’s explicit motives for prosocial-moral actions.
Five questions described everyday prosocial behaviors of helping,
sharing and caring for others, and five questions addressed
antisocial behaviors of physical and verbal aggression, as well as
stealing (for a full list of the interview questions see Appendix).
The ordering of the questions was randomized in the interview.
Coding
Coding categories were derived from approximately 40 randomly
chosen transcripts. Categories were meant to reflect children’s
motives for prosocial-moral actions on a continuum from
external to internal as described by Self-Determination Theory
(Ryan and Deci, 2000). Moreover, categories were defined in
order to capture common themes of prosocial-moral reasoning
as reflected in previously established coding systems (e.g.,
Eisenberg, 1986; Colby and Kohlberg, 1987; Gibbs et al., 1992;
Keller, 1996). External motives for prosocial moral actions were
present when children referred to Standards and rules as motives
for moral actions including global act evaluations (e.g., “Because
my mom and dad told me not to do it”, “Because, I should not do
this,” “Because it is not nice”). By contrast, the most internal form
of moral motivation was present when children referred to their
own Personal-moral preferences including emotions as a motive
for prosocial-moral action (e.g., “Because I don’t want others to
be hurt,” “Because it makes me feel good inside to help”). Between
these two polar extremes were Self-interested, Other-oriented
and Fairness-relatedmotives. Self-interestedmotives were evident
when a child referred to positive or negative consequences to
the self as a motive for prosocial-moral action (e.g., “Because
then they could hurt me,” “If I am not kind, I will not have any
friends”). Other-oriented motives appeared when a child referred
to others’ needs and feelings, or the consequences of an action
for others (e.g., “Because it might hurt their feelings,” “So that
they have something to play with”). In Fairness-related responses,
children elaborated on the rightness or wrongness of an action
by taking another person’s perspective and balancing conflicting
interests (e.g., “I would not want others to hurt me,” “Because
it’s not fair for everybody, and everybody should be treated the
same way”). In addition, there appeared responses that were
either Unelaborated or Unscorable. Responses were considered
Unelaborated when children did not give a qualified answer
that went beyond what was implied in the interviewer question
(e.g., “Just because,” [Why do you want to help another child
who is hurt?] “Because I want to help”). Finally, responses were
considered Unscorable when a qualified response was given but
its meaning remained too vague or too idiosyncratic in order to
fit into one of the categories described above. Using a subset of
50 randomly chosen interviews, two independent raters obtained
92% agreement for the coding system, κ = 0.90.
If a child articulatedmore than onemotive for why s/he would
want to engage in prosocial-moral actions, all motives were coded
separately. Thus, multiple codings were possible. This reduced
linear dependency between codes. Overall, 2382 codes were
generated. Of these coded responses, 18.5% referred to Standards
and rules, 9% were Self-interested, 38% Other-oriented, 4.6%
Fairness-related, and 9.3% referred to Personal-moral preferences.
Moreover, 8.1% of responses were Unelaborated and 12.4% were
considered Unscorable.
For all further statistical analyses, motivation category scores
were tallied across the five prosocial and the five antisocial
interview questions separately, yielding scales that represent how
often each category was used in the two contexts (range 0–5; for
Ms and SDs see Table 1).
Parent-Child Relationships
Participants completed the Network of Relationships Inventory
(NRI; Furman and Buhrmester, 1985) to assess a broad range
of relationship qualities. This measure has been used extensively
in previous research with children ranging from 6 to 13 years
old (e.g., Field et al., 2007; Rubin et al., 2004). The 13-item
short form of the NRI was used in the current study. The short-
form includes two factors: seven items representing support (e.g.,
“How much do you share your secrets and private feelings with
your mother”) and six negative interaction items (e.g., “How
much do you and your mother disagree or quarrel with each
other?”). Participants answered the same set of questions for their
relationship with a mother figure and then again with a father
figure. Participants rated the extent each individual satisfies every
item based on a four-point scale ranging from (1) little or none
to (4) extremely much. For the 4–6-year-olds, the interviewer
read the questions from theNPI aloud, whereas the 8–9-year-olds
TABLE 1 | Means and SDs for explicit moral motives in antisocial and
prosocial contexts.
Antisocial Prosocial
M SD M SD
Unelaborated 0.36a 1.01 0.33a 0.99
Standards and rules 1.06a 1.24 0.55b 0.94
Self-interested 1.37a 1.32 0.37b 0.72
Other-oriented 1.26a 1.23 2.05b 1.64
Fairness-related 0.52a 0.85 0.42a 0.98
Personal-moral 0.36a 0.63 0.45a 0.80
N = 193.
a,bMeans in the same row with different superscripts are significantly different (t-test,
p <0.008).
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were given the option to complete the questionnaire privately or
together with the interviewer. The oldest age group completed
the questionnaire themselves.
In the current sample, there were significant and positive
associations between both maternal and paternal support (r =
0.64, p < 0.01), as well as maternal and paternal negative
interaction (r = 0.57, p < 0.01). Accordingly, summary
variables were created to represent parental support and parent-
child negative interaction. Internal consistency was high for both
the parental support (α = 0.82) and negative interaction (α =
0.88) aggregate variables.
Results
Effects of Context and Age
In order to investigate whether children’s explicit motives for
prosocial-moral action vary by age and context, a Three-Way
mixed model multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
performed: age group (kindergarten, grades 2–3, grades 5–6)
by context (antisocial, prosocial) by category (unelaborated,
standards and rules, self-interested, other-oriented, fairness-
related, personal-moral). Note that the unscorable coding
category was not used in all further analyses as it was of limited
theoretical interest.
The MANOVA revealed no significant main effect of age
group and significant main effects of context as well as category
(see Table 2). The two main effects were qualified by two
significant Two-Way interactions: (a) an interaction between
context and category and (b) an interaction between age group
and category. Thus, children’s explicit moral motives varied by
context (prosocial vs. antisocial), as well as by age.
Mean differences of children’s moral motives by context are
summarized in Table 1. Three motives were most salient in the
antisocial context: standards and rules (M = 1.06, SD = 1.24),
self-interested (M = 1.37, SD = 1.32), and other-oriented (M =
1.26, SD= 1.23). For the prosocial context, by contrast, the other-
oriented category was by far the most prominent (M = 2.05,
SD = 1.64). Pairwise comparisons (t-test, p < 0.05 Bonferroni-
corrected) yielded significant differences between the prosocial
and antisocial context for standards and rules, self-interested,
TABLE 2 | Moral motives by age group, context and category: results of
mixed model MANOVA.
df F η2p
Age group 2, 190 1.96 0.02
Context 1, 190 49.83*** 0.21
Category 5, 186 36.95*** 0.50
Age group × context 2, 190 1.87 0.01
Age group × category 10, 374 8.61*** 0.19
Context × category 5, 186 33.35*** 0.47
Age group × context × category 10, 374 1.84 0.05
All F-values reported are based on Pillai’s Trace test statistic as it is considered most
robust. Other test statistics (Wilk’s Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace, Roy’s Largest Root) yielded
slightly different F-values for some interactions, but all p-values reached the same level of
significance. ***p < 0.001.
as well as other-oriented motives. Thus, children referred to
standards and rules, as well as self-interest more often in the
antisocial context, whereas other-oriented motives were more
salient in the prosocial context.
The significant interaction between age group and category
was followed-up by a post-hoc discriminant descriptive analysis
(DDA; see Warne, 2014) to determine the function that
distinguishes the age groups from each other on the category
scores. Two discriminant functions were created given that
the number of functions is equal to k (groups)—1. The first
function was statistically significant (p < 0.001), while the
second was not (p = 0.07). Thus, the second discriminant
function was not further considered. The evaluation of the
standardized discriminant coefficients for the first function
revealed that fairness had the strongest effect (0.715), followed by
unelaborated (−0.506), personal-moral (0.335), other-oriented
(0.246), self-interested (−0.200), and standards and rules
(−0.012).
Parallel discriminant ratio coefficients (DRC; Thomas, 1992)
were calculated to determine variable importance. For this
function, the strongest parallel DRCs were found for fairness-
related (0.498), unelaborated (0.296), and for personal-moral
preferences (0.130). These parallel DRCs indicate that these three
categories were the more important variables for distinguishing
between age groups. Overall, unelaborated responses decreased
with age, whereas reference to fairness-related motives and
personal-moral preferences increased (see Table 3).
Effects of Parent-Child Relationship
Regression models were performed for each motive category to
examine how children’s explicit motives for prosocial- moral
action are related to supportive parenting. For this purpose,
scales were combined across the prosocial and the antisocial
context. Both gender and exact age were entered in Step
1 of the regression models to control for these potentially
confounding effects. Parental support and parent-child negative
interaction were entered in Step 2. Parent-child relationship
variables significantly predicted two moral motivation categories
after controlling for effects of age and gender: unelaborated
and other-oriented (see Table 4). Parental support negatively
predicted children’s unelaborated moral motivation, whereas the
reverse effect was obtained for parent-child negative interaction.
For other-oriented moral motivation, negative parent-child
TABLE 3 | Means and SDs for moral motives by age group.
Kindergarten Grade 2-3 Grade 5-6
M SD M SD M SD
Unelaborated 0.94 1.49 0.11 0.34 0.12 0.38
Standards and rules 0.82 0.94 0.97 1.11 0.62 0.62
Self-interested 0.94 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.70 0.78
Other-oriented 1.43 1.25 1.75 1.25 1.74 1.11
Fairness-related 0.02 0.09 0.44 0.81 0.87 0.81
Personal-moral 0.17 0.38 0.43 0.57 0.57 0.72
N = 193.
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TABLE 4 | Results of regression analyses predicting unelaborated and
other-oriented moral motivation.
Unelaborated Other-oriented
Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2
β t β t β t β t
Gender −0.03 −0.41 −0.03 −0.41 0.10 1.34 0.05 0.72
Age −0.29 −4.14** −0.29 −4.14** 0.08 1.14 0.08 1.17
Parental
support
−0.15 −2.15* 0.10 1.36
Parent-child
negative
interaction
0.15 2.13* −0.21 −2.97**
1R2 0.09** 0.05** 0.02 0.06**
N = 190.
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
interaction turned out to be a significant predictor. Lower levels
of parent-child negative interaction were associated with more
other-oriented moral motivation.
Discussion
The present study was meant to investigate children’s explicit
motives for why they want to engage in prosocial actions and do
not want to behave antisocially. Contrary to Piaget (1932/1999)
and Kohlberg (1976), recent research stressed the autonomous
and internal nature of children’s moral motivation. However, this
research has been mostly focused on children’s implicit motives
for prosocial-moral actions, whereas their explicit motives have
not been directly investigated so far.
In line with previous research, it was found that other-oriented
motives, overall, were most salient in children’s explicit responses
to the question why they want to engage in prosocial-moral
actions. Other-oriented motives were already dominant in 4–
6-year-olds and did not significantly increase with age. Thus, a
concern for others’ feelings and needs clearly plays an important
role in children’s explicit moral motivation. However, this general
finding needs to be qualified in various respects.
Other-orientedmotives were particularly salient in the context
of prosocial actions. In contradistinction, in the antisocial context
children referred equally often to external standards and rules
(e.g., “I should not do this”), as well as to self-interest (e.g.,
“They could hurt me”). According to Kohlberg’s scheme, these
responses would qualify as preconventional (Stage 1 and Stage
2). Whereas, Kohlberg’s theory would predict a decrease in these
responses, in the present study no significant effects of age
were found. External standards and self-interest were important
concerns even for 10–12-year-olds. Thus, children’s explicit
motivation to abstain from antisocial or aggressive behavior
appears to be less autonomous and less internal than current
research on children’s morality suggests.
Whereas, reference to standards and rules as well as self-
interest did not change with age, age-related differences in
children’s explicit motives were found for other categories. First,
unelaborated responses declined between the age of Kindergarten
and Grade 2–3. Thus, with increasing age, children became better
able to explicate their motives for prosocial-moral action. This
finding is reminiscent of the Piagetian notion that children’s
moral development starts from morality in action and later
becomes cognitively (re)constructed (cf. Hammond, 2014).
Secondly, it was found that fairness-related (e.g., “I would
not want others to hurt me”) and personal-moral preferences
(e.g., “I don’t want others to be hurt”) responses increased
with age. Both types of responses indicate higher levels of
organismic integration as described by Self-Determination
Theory (Deci and Ryan, 2014). Thus, even though children’s
implicit moral motivation from an early age can be characterized
as autonomous, particularly in the context of prosocial actions,
this by no means precludes further development with regard to
the integration of morality into the self (see Krettenauer, 2014).
As was found in the present study, children who experienced
their parents as supportive and who reported fewer negative
interactions with their parents were more other-oriented and
were better able to explicate their motives for moral action.
Both findings are consistent with previous research. It has
been demonstrated repeatedly that children’s sensitivity to
others’ needs grows in the context of positive and supportive
relationships with caregivers (e.g., Thompson et al., 2006). At the
same time, social contexts that support self-determination led to
greater autonomy and congruencies between implicit and explicit
motives (Schattke et al., 2011; Deci and Ryan, 2012).
The present study was limited in various respects. First of
all, data were cross-sectional. Thus, differences between age
groups may be due to factors other than age. Second, the study
did not include measures of children’s implicit motives for
prosocial-moral action. As a consequence, it was not possible
to investigate the degree of (in) consistency between these two
types of motivation. Third, measures of parent-child relationship
were based on children’s self-report and may not accurately
reflect actual parent-child interactions. Finally, as with all explicit
measures, the study’s assessment of children’s explicit motives
for prosocial-moral actions may be susceptible to various self-
presentation and social desirability response biases. Even though
a measure of social desirability response bias that was part
of the Children’s Moral Self Puppet Interview (for details see
Krettenauer et al., 2013) did not yield significant associations
with any moral motive category (correlations ranged between
r = −0.11 and 0.10, p’s > 0.10), it cannot be ruled out that
children responses were influenced by demand characteristics
of the interview situation. Please note, however, that the verbal
methods employed in the present study are very well in line with
contemporary research designed to elucidate children’s moral
development (e.g., Malti et al., 2009; Nunner-Winkler, 2009;
Weller and Lagattuta, 2014).
Regardless of these limitations, the present study suggests that
it may be premature to fully abandon Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s
theories. To be sure, both theories do not adequately grasp the
moral autonomy that is evident particularly in young children’s
implicit moral motivation. However, there are heteronomous
elements in children’s morality, notably when children provide
explicit reasons for why they do not want to engage in antisocial
or aggressive behaviors. These heteronomous elements likely
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reflect the social fact that antisocial behavior is often actively
prohibited by parental authorities and sanctioned as a vast
body of research on discipline encounters suggests (cf. Grusec,
2006). Thus, this finding aligns well with Piaget’s perspective on
moral development, where moral heteronomy is attributable to
imbalances in power relationships (see Helwig, 2008). Whereas,
Piaget and Kohlberg both stressed the heteronomous nature
of children’s morality, current research emphasizes its intrinsic,
cooperative, and autonomous features. Ultimately, it may be
misleading to assume a homogenous motivation from which
all moral action develops. Moral motivation in childhood and
beyond is multi-faceted and much more heterogeneous than
prominent theories on moral development (past and present)
suggest.
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Appendix
Interview Questions
Avoidance of Antisocial Behavior
(1) Why would you not want to push other children?
(2) Why would you not want to take something that does not
belong to you?
(3) Why would you not want to make other children angry?
(4) Why would you not want to tease other children?
(5) Why would you not want to break other children’s toys?
Preference for Prosocial Behavior
(1) Why would you want to help another child who is
hurt?
(2) Why would you want to share candies with other
children?
(3) Why would you want to be kind to others?
(4) Why would you want to give away your toys to children who
do not have enough to play with?
(5) Why would you want to get food for a child you know is
hungry?
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